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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has long prided itself on the quality of justice
dispensed by its criminal courts. We have taken special care to ensure that
convictions rest on a reliable basis. In contrast to civil law systems that
recognize few exclusionary rules of evidence, the United States still adheres
to the common law trilogy of exclusionary rules based on the supposed
unreliability of certain types of evidence.2 Since the common law preferred
that witnesses recite facts and allow the trier of fact to decide which, if any,
inferences to draw from the facts, American courts enforce a general opinion
prohibition.3 Similarly, since the common law was skeptical of paraphrasing
documents, the courts generally demand the production of the original
document and exclude secondary evidence of a document’s contents.4
Finally, the common law preferred that witnesses appear in person, testify
under oath, and be subject to cross-examination in view of the trier of fact.
That preference accounts for the general exclusion of hearsay testimony.5
Dean John Henry Wigmore famously remarked that the hearsay doctrine was
the “most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of Evidence.”6
Although England has substantially liberalized its version of the hearsay
rule, American courts still vigorously enforce the rule.7 The United States
arguably has the most restrictive set of evidentiary rules in the world; and if
those rules serve their intended purpose of enhancing the reliability of the
verdicts resting on evidence, the typical American conviction should be
exceptionally reliable.
In its celebrated 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court dealt with one aspect of the
opinion prohibition, namely, the restrictions on the admissibility of expert
opinions. Predictably, the Court focused on the question of the reliability of
expert opinions admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In Justice
Blackmun’s words, “under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but

2

RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, JULIE SEAMAN & ERICA BEECHERMONAS, EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 96 (7th ed.
2012).
3
FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note on proposed rule (“The older cases often
contained strictures against allowing witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate issues, as a
particular aspect of the rule against opinions.”).
4
FED. R. EVID. 1002.
5
FED. R. EVID. 801, 802.
6
JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1364 (3d ed. 1940).
7
CARLSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 566–57.
8
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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reliable.”9 He stated that to be admissible, a scientific opinion “must be
derived by the scientific method . . . [,] supported by appropriate
validation.”10 Justice Blackmun explained that that test “establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability.”11 Thus, in his view, “evidentiary
reliability [is] based upon scientific validity.”12
A. The Indications That Flawed Expert Testimony Has Already
Contributed to a Significant Number of Wrongful Convictions
Given this strong judicial commitment to reliability, the revelations of
the number of wrongful convictions in the United States are troubling. By
late 2016, post-conviction DNA testing had resulted in the exoneration of
over 340 wrongfully convicted accused.13 More broadly, the National
Registry of Exonerations listed nearly 2,000 wrongful convictions.14 In one
way or another, all fifty states now permit post-conviction DNA testing to
identify wrongful convictions.15 The magnitude of the problem has
prompted twenty-eight states to go to the length of enacting legislative
schemes for compensating wrongfully convicted accused.16
To make matters worse, it is clear that flawed expert testimony
contributed to a significant percentage of these wrongful convictions.
Invalid expert testimony has become a disturbingly “recurrent theme[]” in
9
Id. at 589. See also id. at 597 (“[T]he Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do
assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”).
10
Id. at 590.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 590–91 n.9. See also Vincent P. Iannece, Note, Breaking Bad Science: Due
Process as a Vehicle for Post-Conviction Relief When Convictions Are Based on Unreliable
Scientific Evidence, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 195, 196 (2015) (noting “the Supreme Court’s
requirement that only reliable expert testimony be admitted”).
13
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 3 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/m
icrosites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [hereinafter PCAST]. See
also M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s
Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 13, 19 (2016). See also id. at 63–
93.
14
As of February 26, 2017, the registry had catalogued 1,994 exonerations. NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration (last visited
Apr. 18, 2018). See also Ken Strutin, Report—President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology Casts Doubt on Criminal Forensics, LLRX (Mar. 19, 2017),
http://www.llrx.com/2017/03/report-presidents-council-of-advisors-on-science-and-technolo
gy; Meghan J. Ryan & John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of Wrongful
Conviction, 68 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1076 (2015) (“Since 1989, over 1,700 individuals have
been exonerated of the crimes for which they were convicted”).
15
DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK
18 (2016).
16
Id. at 23.
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the wrongful conviction studies.17 Of the first 250 DNA exoneration cases
in the United States, more than half of the cases involved overstated or
invalid expert testimony.18 One study of 156 accused exonerated by postconviction DNA testing reported that at 60% of the trials, “forensic analysts
called by the prosecution provided invalid testimony . . . —that is, testimony
with conclusions misstating empirical data or wholly unsupported by
empirical data.”19 In order to address these deficiencies, several states
(including New York and Texas) have established forensic science
commissions to oversee the government laboratories and agencies providing
expert witness services.20 For their part, twenty-six localities have created
conviction integrity review units.21
B. The Probability That in the Future the Courts Will Be Asked to
Grant Post-Conviction Relief Based on Subsequently Invalidated
Expert Testimony in a Significant Number of Cases
The past revelations have raised the consciousness of the general
problem of wrongful convictions. In the future the courts will probably face
a large number of cases in which the basis for relief is the claim that
subsequent scientific research has invalidated expert testimony that
contributed to the prior conviction.
In the typical case not involving expert testimony, several factors
concur to minimize the probability that there will be a future, plausible attack
on the prior conviction or another accused’s conviction. Only a limited
number of persons have a strong incentive to scrutinize the testimony
underlying the prior conviction. To be sure, the accused, his or her counsel,
and his or her family may be motivated to do so. However, it will be the rare
third party whose sense of justice or curiosity is so strong that they are
willing to devote time and resources to a post-conviction investigation.
17
Inger H. Chandler, Conviction Integrity Review Units: Owning the Past, Changing the
Future, 31 CRIM. JUST. 14, 15 (2016). See also BOAZ SANGERO, SAFETY FROM FALSE
CONVICTIONS (2016); Erin Murphy, Neuroscience and the Civil / Criminal Daubert Divide, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 634 (2016) (“The raised awareness of the problem of wrongful
conviction, and the prominent role that faulty science has played in those injustices . . . .”).
18
Brandon L. Garrett, Bad Hair: The Legal Response to Mass Forensic Errors, 42 LITIG.
32, 32, 33 (2016).
19
Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting that there were 82 such cases: “this
set of trials included invalid testimony by 72 forensic analysts called by the prosecution and
employed by 52 laboratories, practices, or hospitals from 25 states”).
20
Ryan & Adams, supra note 14, at 1110; FORENSIC TECH. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, NAT’L
INST. OF JUST. & RTI INT’L, STATE FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSIONS: FINAL REPORT (Nov.
2016), https://rti.connectsolutions.com/sfsc; Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, Criminal
Procedure vs. Scientific Progress: The Challenging Path to Post-Conviction Relief in Cases
That Arise During Periods of Shifts in Science, 41 VT. L. REV. 279, 333 (2016).
21
Chandler, supra note 17, at 15; Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 338.
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Moreover, even when these investigators tender the court’s evidence to
challenge the validity of the prior conviction, many courts are skeptical of
the reliability of the new evidence. Generally, investigators such as members
of the accused’s family are hardly impartial; and the courts fear that they
might have resorted to bribery or duress to obtain the new evidence.22 For
that reason, the investigators’ tender of new evidence does not guarantee that
the court will grant post-conviction relief.23 The tender is often greeted with
judicial skepticism. Finally, even if the investigators succeed in overturning
the prior conviction, their efforts will likely affect only that case. Their
investigation is usually case-specific. Thus, even if the investigators unearth
persuasive evidence of false confession or mistaken eyewitness
identification, that evidence ordinarily will have no impact on any other case.
In each respect, expert testimony cases differ radically. Although in the
typical case only a small number of persons will pursue a later investigation
into the evidence that served as the basis for the prior conviction, in an expert
testimony case, thousands of scientists worldwide may be engaged in
ongoing research into the validity of the expert technique in question. The
state of the research into the technique’s validity may very well be “in
flux.”24 Furthermore, the vast majority of these scientific investigators will
be strangers to the prior litigation and, hence, more impartial. Even if a court
is reluctant to grant a new trial based on testimony by a lay witness
discovered by the accused’s family, the court may be receptive to testimony
by a German physicist who made a discovery during her independent
research. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the significance of the
scientific discovery is likely to transcend the post-trial proceeding in which
testimony about the discovery is offered.25 Unlike the case-specific
testimony offered in the typical case,26 the subsequent discovery may relate
to a general scientific question27 that arose in hundreds or thousands of prior
criminal trials. Together, these factors create a good probability that in future
post-conviction relief proceedings, many courts will have to grapple with the
question of the impact of subsequent scientific research. If a prior conviction
rested on expert testimony, has the later research raised such grave questions
about the reliability of the testimony that the accused should receive a new
trial?
22
Janice J. Repka, Comment, Rethinking the Standard for New Trial Motions Based
Upon Recantations as Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1986).
23
Id.; Tim A. Thomas, Standard for Granting or Denying New Trial in State Criminal
Case on Basis of Recanted Testimony: Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 1031 (1989).
24
Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2016).
25
David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner,
48 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 974, 976–79 (1997).
26
Id. at 976, 979.
27
Id. at 976–77.
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This question has become so pressing that several jurisdictions have
recently amended their post-conviction relief statutes to address the question.
In 2014, the California legislature amended Penal Code Section 1473. That
statute governs the grant of new trial motions when a prior conviction rests
on “false evidence.”28 As amended, Section 1473(e)(1) now reads: “For
purposes of this section, ‘false evidence’ shall include opinions of experts
that have been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion
at a hearing or trial or that has been undermined by later scientific research
or technological advances.”29 The amendment took effect in 2015. In the
same year, Texas revised its Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.073.
Subsection (a) of that statute now provides that an accused is entitled to a
new trial if he or she presents testimony about expert research that “was not
available . . . at the convicted person’s trial” and that “contradicts scientific
evidence relied on by the state at trial.”30
The purpose of this Article is to assess the advisability of postconviction relief legislation specifically addressing the issue of the
subsequent invalidation of expert testimony that served as the basis for a
prior conviction. Part II of this Article defines and delimits the scope of this
Article. It explains that this Article addresses the problem as an issue of
criminal justice policy, not as a matter of constitutional law. Part III turns to
the question of when, if ever, subsequent scientific research should justify a
new trial. To what extent must the later research call into question the
reliability of the earlier expert testimony? And which components of the
prior expert reasoning can be targeted? Finally, Part IV takes up the question
of the adequacy of the existing state post-conviction relief legislation.
Assume that as a matter of policy an accused should obtain relief in the
situations identified in Part III. Are the existing statutes worded broadly
enough that we can be confident that a deserving accused can obtain relief?
If not, is the wording of the new California or Texas legislation an optimal
model for reform?

28
WILKES, JR., supra note 15, § 7:61 (“[T]he legislation was originally introduced to
address a problem illustrated by the so-called Rampart scandal in which it was discovered that
certain Los Angeles Police Department officers had engaged in misconduct, including
planting evidence, filing false police reports, committing perjury, and creating nonexistent
confessions.”). See Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35 (discussing the new
California and Texas legislation).
29
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (West 2017).
30
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West 2015).
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II. DELIMITING AND DEFINING THE TOPIC
This problem area raises a plethora of issues. An article of this length
can mention some of those issues in passing, but it cannot hope to adequately
address all the aspects of the problem. Therefore, before defining the topic
of this Article, it is critical to delimit the topic and identify the issues that are
beyond its scope. In particular, this Article does not address three related
topics: (A) constitutional claims; (B) claims based on scientific research
available at the time of the prior trial; and (C) the role that the subsequently
invalidated scientific evidence played at the prior trial.
A. Constitutional Claims
This Article does not discuss the question of whether there is a
constitutional right to post-conviction relief in the situations identified in
Part III. In the past, the Supreme Court has indicated that
[t]he Constitution . . . protects a defendant against a conviction
based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting
the introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant
means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted
as unworthy of credit. Constitutional safeguards available to
defendants to counter the State’s evidence include the Sixth
Amendments right to counsel; compulsory process; and
confrontation plus cross-examination of witnesses.31
In Herrera v. Collins,32 the Court observed that it has never treated a claim
of innocence based on newly discovered evidence as a basis for federal
habeas corpus relief absent an independent constitutional violation.33
However, in her concurrence in Herrera, Justice O’Connor was willing
to assume arguendo that “a truly persuasive of actual innocence would
render any . . . execution unconstitutional . . . .”34 Later in House v. Bell,35
the Court referred to a “hypothetical freestanding innocence claim.” The
31
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012). See Iannece, supra note 12, at
210–11; Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 305 (“the Due Process Clause has traditionally
been understood to guarantee procedures, not outcomes”).
32
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). See Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 323–
24.
33
506 U.S. at 389–99. See Justin Brooks, Alexander Simpson & Paige Kaneb, If
Hindsight Is 20/20, Our Justice System Should Not Be Blind to New Evidence of Innocence:
A Survey of Post-Conviction New Evidence Statutes and a Proposed Model, 79 ALB. L. REV.
1045, 1051 (2016).
34
506 U.S. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at
324 (“[A]t least five members of the Court . . . would have explicitly held that a freestanding
claim of actual innocence is cognizable, at least under certain circumstances.”).
35
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
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freestanding theory enjoys some scholarly support.36 A number of state
courts have held that “the conviction of an innocent person [is itself] . . . a
violation of due process.”37 Moreover, several lower federal courts have
acknowledged the theoretical possibility of a “freestanding” constitutional
“innocence claim.”38 However, those courts have cautioned that even if such
a claim is possible, the threshold would be “extraordinarily high”39 and that
relief would be available “only in very narrow circumstances.”40
This Article does not venture into that constitutional thicket. It
undertakes a non-constitutional policy analysis. Rather than invoking due
process, this Article poses this question: If our criminal justice system is now
so dependent on expert testimony and the trajectory of science makes it
inevitable that subsequent research will sometimes invalidate the expert
testimony that a prior conviction rests on, should post-conviction relief
statutes afford the wrongly accused a remedy?
B. Claims Based on Scientific Research Available at the Time of the
Prior Trial
This Article has the same temporal focus as the new California and
Texas legislation. California Penal Code Section 1473(e)(1) expressly refers
to expert testimony that has “been undermined by later scientific research or
technological advances.” Likewise, under Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 11.073(a)(1), the scientific research that the accused relies
on must “not [have been] available . . . at the convicted person’s trial.”41 The
research must constitute after-discovered evidence that could not have been
offered at trial despite the exercise of due diligence by the defense counsel.
If the scientific studies were available at the time of the prior trial, the
accused’s primary avenue for relief is an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.42 The Supreme Court upheld such a claim in its 2014 decision in
36

Iannece, supra note 12.
See e.g., Chandler, supra note 17, at 16 (Texas law).
38
Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Albrecht v. Horn, 485
F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2007)).
39
Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 122.
40
Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1145.
41
Ex parte Avila, No. WR–59,662–02, 2016 WL 922191 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 9,
2016). See Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 284–89 (noting that new scientific information
is not distributed perfectly; it takes time for the research to “percolate;” even if it is circulating
within the scientific community, as a practical matter, it may be unavailable to defense
counsel; it is too much to expect counsel to discover new scientific research as soon as it is
released); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited: Percolation
Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 64 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 483 (2016). See Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35.
42
Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2016); Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1050, 1066 (noting due diligence);
37
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Hinton v. Alabama.43 Hinton’s conviction rested in large part on firearms
identification testimony. When he later sought federal habeas relief, Hinton
did not point to any new breakthroughs in the field of firearms identification.
Rather, the thrust of his argument was that his prior defense counsel had not
presented a competent attack on the prosecution expert testimony:
The defense lawyer did hire an expert, one with poor vision and
poor qualifications. He testified that the revolver was corroded
and could not be compared to any bullet. The expert admitted that
he had only the use of one eye, making it difficult to see through
a forensic microscope. Later, during federal habeas proceeding,
new lawyers argued that Hinton’s trial attorney was ineffective for
failing to hire competent and qualified ballistics experts. The new
attorneys hired three new and highly qualified experts from
leading laboratories, who all concluded that the bullets were not
fired from Hinton’s gun[.]44
Even before Hinton, numerous lower courts had granted post-conviction
relief when the trial defense counsel neglected to marshal readily available
scientific data that would have permitted an effective attack on prosecution
expert testimony. These lower court cases involve arson analysis, cell tower
evidence, fingerprint examination, pathology
testimony, and
pharmacological evidence.45
Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 295 (noting that there are “two possible” relevant
ineffective assistance claims: “(a) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to discover the
present an alternative to the science presented by the State; and (b) ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to object to and/or prevent the prosecution’s experts from testifying at all
by moving to exclude their testimony . . . .”). See State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (discussing the reasonable diligence requirement).
43
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014).
44
Garrett, supra note 42, at 1164–65.
45
Id. at 1169–70 (collecting cases). See also Paul C. Giannelli & Sarah Antonucci,
Forensic Experts and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 1360 (2012). As
the official Comment to American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.1 notes, these fact situations can raise legal ethical issues as well as constitutional
law questions. See also MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). In the classic statistical testimony
case, People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968), the court suggested that it was unfair to
expect defense attorneys, unschooled in mathematics, to detect the flaws in the prosecution’s
statistical evidence. However, it is arguably the responsibility of the opposing party to learn
enough about the discipline to educate the jurors about the limitations of the testimony. Under
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 and 1.3, counsel owes duties of
competence and diligence to his or her client. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, r. 1.3
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The Comment to Rule 1.1 contemplates that it may sometimes be
appropriate for counsel to research topics on the Internet in order to provide competent
counsel. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (citing Ellie
Margolis, Surfin’ Safari: Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10 YALE J.
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Simply stated, when the defense counsel could feasibly have accessed
the scientific research at the time of the accused’s original trial, there is no
need to resort to special legislation such as the new California and Texas
statutes. Instead, the accused can invoke the well-settled doctrine of
ineffective assistance of counsel and cite favorable, recent precedents such
as Hinton.
C. The Related, But Distinct Issue of the Impact of the Subsequently
Invalidated Expert Testimony at the Prior Trial
When an accused seeks post-conviction relief based on the subsequent
invalidation of the testimony that his or her conviction rests on, the accused
must satisfy a both/and proposition: the accused must not only demonstrate
that later scientific research undermined prosecution expert testimony
introduced at the prior trial, but also must establish that the testimony played
a major role in persuading the trier of fact to convict at the prior trial. Thus,
the defense must prove the effect of the subsequent scientific research on the
prosecution expert testimony as well as the effect of the expert testimony on
the trier of fact’s decision. Even when subsequent scientific research utterly
discredits the prosecution expert testimony introduced at the prior trial, the
accused should not be entitled to a new trial if that testimony played a minor
role at the trial.
The standard for the latter showing deserves extended treatment in a
separate article.46 The showing of the impact of the testimony on the prior
verdict is just as essential to the accused’s claim for relief as the showing of
the effect of the subsequent scientific research on the reliability of the expert
testimony. Moreover, the courts are currently divided over the standard for
proving the requisite material impact. One school of thought is that the
L. & TECH. 82 (2007)). Any contemporary counsel ought to realize that scientific testimony
is frequently proffered at trial. That is especially true in jurisdictions with discovery rules
modeled after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. By virtue of Rule 16, if the defense
makes a timely request, each testifying prosecution expert must provide a report outlining his
or her testimony. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE
CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 3.03 (5th ed. 2015). Even if it was justifiable
to excuse a defense attorney’s ignorance in 1968, a half century later, that excuse rings hollow.
46
That issue is the central focus of Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1056–65. The question
is also one of the principal concerns of Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 299 (“material”).
Neither article addresses the question of the method of determining whether the new scientific
research raises sufficient doubts about the accuracy of the prior testimony. Some of the
published literature merges and thereby confuses the two, analytically distinct issues. See,
e.g., Caitlin Plummer & Imran Syed, “Shifted Science” and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 259, 268 (2012) (“The mere fact that a valid competing scientific theory has
emerged suffices as ‘shifted science’ potentially calling the conviction into doubt. . . . [T]he
legal standard for new evidence warranting a new trial, while it varies by jurisdiction, is
generally targeted at whether the new evidence would have caused reasonable doubt if
presented at trial.”).
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systemic interest in finality is so weighty that the accused must demonstrate
that it is likely or probable that the exclusion of the prosecution expert
testimony at the prior trial or the presentation of new research challenging
that testimony would have changed the outcome of the earlier trial.47 In
contrast, other courts are satisfied with a showing of a reasonable possibility
of an acquittal—in other words, a showing that the trier of fact might have
reached a different conclusion.48 To muddy the waters, still other courts
sometimes employ the standard of a reasonable probability that the newly
discovered scientific evidence could have affected the outcome.49 That issue
is a question for another day. Rather than discussing the standard for
evaluating the impact of the new evidence on the verdict, this Article focuses
on the effect of the new scientific research on the prosecution expert
testimony. Part III.A addresses the policy question of when the availability
of such research trumps finality and justifies granting a new trial. Part III.B
argues that there are five situations in which a new trial is warranted. Part
III then turns to the question of whether the existing post-conviction relief
statutes have to be amended to allow a new trial in those situations. Are the
statutes broad enough to allow relief?
III.

WHEN, IF EVER, SHOULD NEW SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH JUSTIFY
AWARDING THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF OF A NEW TRIAL?

This Part addresses two issues. The first, discussed in Part III.A, is the
general standard for determining when subsequent scientific research has
invalidated the prosecution expert testimony introduced at a prior trial to the
extent that it ought to triumph over the public interest in finality. Next, Part
III.B identifies five situations in which later scientific research can satisfy
that general standard.

47

Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 121 (3d Cir. 2007) (“more likely than not”), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1108 (2008); United States v. Mahdi, 172 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68 (D.D.C. 2016);
United States v. Slough, 144 F. Supp. 3d 4, 14 (D.D.C. 2015); In re Miles, No. G046534,
2017 WL 222569 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2017); In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195, 202 (Cal.
2016); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Chandler, supra note
17, at 15 (noting that the defendant “would not have been convicted . . . .”); Iannece, supra
note 12, at 231; Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 316 (“a reasonable probability”); Repka,
supra note 22, at 1439; Thomas, supra note 23, § 2 (noting that the leading authority is Berry
v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851)).
48
Repka, supra note 22, at 1454; Thomas, supra note 23, at § 2 (noting that the leading
authority is Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928)).
49
In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195, 202 (Cal. 2016); In re Figueroa, 412 P.3d 356 (Cal.
2018).
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A. The General Invalidation Standard
Suppose that at a criminal trial, the prosecution relies on expert
testimony to gain a conviction. After the trial, the scientific community
produces new research relevant to the reliability of the expert testimony. The
new research could have several impacts on the prior testimony. At one
extreme, the research could confirm the validity of the prior testimony. At
the other extreme, the research could completely discredit the expert
testimony. To complicate matters, there are several points on the spectrum
between the two polar extremes. For example, the new research could
simply call into question the validity of the expert testimony and create a
controversy over its validity. Or, even if the research does not affirmatively
disprove the prior testimony, the research could raise such grave doubts
about the reliability of the testimony that it would undermine any rational
decision-maker’s confidence in the prior testimony. As Holmes observed,
the courts are always drawing lines.50 Where should the line be drawn here?
At what point do the profound public interests in liberty and accurate judicial
outcomes outweigh the considerable systemic interest in finality?51
1. One Extreme, Subsequent Research Confirming the Validity
of the Earlier Testimony
At the two extremes, the answer is obvious. If the later scientific studies
generally confirm the validity of the prior testimony, there certainly is no
justification for awarding a new trial. Consider the relationship between two
DNA typing techniques, the earlier Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphism (RFLP) technique using single-locus probes52 and the later
Short Tandem Repeat (STR)53 technique. Although the latter technique
analyzes shorter fragments than the former technique, both techniques rely
on length polymorphisms. Depending on the number of loci STR fragments
sampled, STR can yield more impressive random match probabilities (RMP)
than RFLP. However, the two technologies often yield results that are
generally consistent. In many instances, both technologies produce matches;
and in a large number of cases, both yield exclusions. In short, although STR
proved to have more practical utility than RFLP, the advent of STR did not
call into question the essential validity of single-locus probe RFLP. If a
litigant’s resources and time permitted, a litigant well might employ both
RFLP and STR; and the result of one technique could corroborate the other
50

OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881).
Ex parte White, 506 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (noting the choice between
finality and accuracy in the results of cases).
52
PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL
MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18.03[b] (5th ed. 2012) [hereinafter GIANNELLI ET AL.].
53
Id. § 18.03[c].
51

IMWINKELRIED (DO NOT DELETE)

1108

8/8/2018 1:39 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1095

test result. In this situation, it would be a waste of time to grant a new trial
solely because subsequent research made a new technology available. A new
technology can represent an improvement over a prior technology without
condemning the prior technology as junk science.
2. The Other Extreme, Subsequent Research Thoroughly
Discrediting the Validity of the Earlier Testimony
If we go back farther in the history of DNA typing, though, we
encounter the other extreme in which the subsequent studies almost
thoroughly invalidate the prior testimony. When American forensic
laboratories began utilizing DNA typing in the early 1980s, they employed
a different version of RFLP based on multi-locus probes.54 When a
laboratory uses multi-locus probes, the probe can strike several proximate
locations on the same chromosome. As the 1992 National Research Council
DNA Report emphasized, the use of multi-locus probes made it improper for
laboratories to employ the multiplication or product rule to compute the
random match probability.55 After the laboratory had identified the genetic
markers at the various locations, the laboratory would find the population
frequency for each marker and multiply all the frequencies to compute the
overall RMP—the probability that a random person in the same population
would have the same genetic profile. However, it is axiomatic that the
multiplication or product rule may not be used unless the multiplicands (the
probabilities or frequencies being multiplied) are independent. If the sites
are close together on the same chromosome, there is no assurance of
independence. For that reason, the 1992 Report recommended the
immediate discontinuation of the use of multi-locus probe RFLP results as a
basis for computing the RMP. Laboratories shifted en masse to single-locus
probes targeting sites on different chromosomes.
In this situation, two factors concurred. First, the two technologies
yielded different outcomes. An RMP based on multi-locus probe analysis
often differed radically from the RMP based on single-locus probe analysis.
Secondly, molecular biologists and population geneticists advanced a direct,
foundational criticism of reliance of multi-locus probes; they identified a
fatal flaw in an essential premise of the prior methodology, the lack of proof
of independence. The concurrence of those factors so completely discredited
the earlier technology that multi-locus probe RFLP is now “passe.”56 This
development reflected an immediate, widespread recognition that the
subsequent scientific analysis had invalidated the prior methodology. This
is the rare case in which the later research exposed the prior methodology as
54
55
56

Id. § 18.03[a].
Id. § 18.04[c][2].
Id. § 18.03[a].
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“almost entirely unreliable.”57
In that light, suppose that at an earlier trial, the prosecution had
presented an impressive RMP based on multi-locus probe RFLP analysis. A
later single-locus probe RFLP analysis yields either an outright exclusion or
a dramatically smaller RMP. Given the foundational flaw in the use of RFLP
multi-locus probe results to compute the RMP, it would be justifiable to grant
the accused a new trial—assuming, of course, that the defense satisfied the
other post-conviction relief requirements such as the requisite showing of the
effect of the earlier RFLP testimony on the verdict.58
3. Subsequent Research Raising Doubts About the Validity of
the Prior Testimony
Assume that after a criminal trial at which the prosecution relied on
expert testimony, later scientific research raises a question about the validity
of the testimony. Standing alone, that should not lead to a new trial. One of
the most important passages in Daubert is Justice Blackmun’s frank
recognition of the unavoidable uncertainty in investigational science: “it
would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony
must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in
science.”59 In making that remark, Justice Blackmun drew on several amicus
curiae briefs filed by individual scientists and scientific organizations.60 The
traditional, popular view was that this is an orderly universe, governed by
invariable physical laws that can be discovered by the classical scientific
methodology of formulating a hypothesis, subjecting the hypothesis to
empirical testing, and critically evaluating the test results.61 On that
assumption, absolute certainty is attainable.

57

Iannece, supra note 12, at 219 (quoting United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1041
(9th Cir. 2010)). See also id. at 220 (citing Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517–18 (6th Cir.
2000)) (stating “indisputably false”); Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1048 (stating
“completely undermine”); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 336–39, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005) (noting that subsequent research undermined the assumptions of Comparative Bullet
Lead Analysis (CBLA) testimony; the opinion describes the research conducted by experts
such as Erik Randich, a metallurgist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, and
William Tobin, a retired chief metallurgist at the FBI; and in a letter, Dr. Randich flatly stated
that the available empirical data demonstrated that the assumptions underlying CBLA—
namely, that each production batch was unique and homogeneous—were “not valid”).
58
See supra Part II.
59
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
60
Id.
61
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching
Implications of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific
Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 59–60 (1995).
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However, as the amicus briefs informed the Court, that is no longer the
modern understanding of the scientific enterprise. Today there is a more
realistic sense of the limitations of investigational science. In some cases,
scientists rely on deductive reasoning. If one defines “two” in a certain way
and “four” in a certain way, one can deduce that two plus two equals four.
However, that is not how investigational science proceeds. Modern
scientists rely on inductive and abductive reasoning. Suppose that when a
scientist subjects a hypothesis to an empirical test, the result appears to
validate the hypothesis. That gives the scientist a measure of confidence in
the hypothesis. If a second test also seems to verify the hypothesis, the
scientist can have even greater confidence in the hypothesis. However, no
matter how many test outcomes seemingly confirm the hypothesis, another
test is always conceivable; and so long as that is the case, there is a possibility
of subsequent falsification of the hypothesis.62 Thus, no matter how many
test results apparently validate the hypothesis, in principle the hypothesis can
be accepted only provisionally or tentatively.63 Absolute certainty is beyond
reach.
Suppose that after the trial, a single new scientific study reaches an
outcome at odds with the validity of the expert technique relied on at trial.
The subsequent research may render the prior testimony debatable but, at
this point, the testimony has hardly been debunked. The outcome in the new
research could easily be an artifact. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of shaken
baby syndrome (SBS) in Gimenez v. Ochoa64 is illustrative. Some lower
courts had earlier granted post-conviction relief to wrongfully convicted
persons on the basis of SBS,65 but in this 2016 decision the Ninth Circuit
refused to do so.
The thesis of SBS is that the violent shaking of an infant can cause fatal
brain injuries even if the infant’s brain does not strike any object or surface.66
Many pediatricians and pathologists subscribe to the SBS hypothesis
because there are documented cases in which the autopsy revealed such brain
injuries when there was evidence of shaking but no striking. These experts
typically rely on three hallmarks to diagnose SBS: subdural hematoma, brain

62

Id. at 60–62.
Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994); Brian
Stuart Koukoutchos, Solomon Meets Galileo (And Isn’t Quite Sure What to Do With Him), 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2237, 2253 (1994).
64
See generally Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2016).
65
State v. Edmonds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008); Iannece, supra note 12, at
217.
66
See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of
the Scientific (and Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156 (2010).
63
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swelling, and retinal hemorrhage.67 However, in recent years biomechanical
experts have sharply criticized the hypothesis.68 They rely primarily on
studies with primates and anthropomorphic models. Those studies suggest
that without more, mere shaking cannot generate enough force to cause fatal
injury to the infant brain.
At Gimenez’s original trial, the prosecution presented a pediatrician’s
testimony about SBS. After his conviction, Gimenez sought post-conviction
relief. He cited the subsequent studies questioning SBS:
He points to a number of articles supporting his claim that medical
knowledge surrounding SBS has changed in the years since his
conviction. In his view, no longer do forensic pathologists
diagnose SBS simply by noting the presence of the telltale triad of
injuries. Now, the medical community requires evidence of
impact injuries before diagnosing SBS.69
Judge Kozinski wrote for the court. He conceded that several studies lent
support to Gimenez’ position.
However, in the judge’s mind, a
comprehensive literature review “reveal[ed] not so much a repudiation of
triad only SBS, but a vigorous debate over about its validity within the
science community. The debate continues to the present day.”70 Indeed,
some of the most recent scholarly analyses of SBS vigorously defend the
hypothesis and dismiss the criticisms of the hypothesis.71

67

Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1139, 1143.
Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 174–80.
69
Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1143. See Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that there has been a shift in scientific opinions about SBS).
70
Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1145. See People v. Flores-Estrada, 2017 WL 1520895 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2017) (although there is currently a legitimate debate over the validity of
SBS, an expert may still base an opinion on that theory); Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at
327 (“the science is still very much in debate in that field . . . .”).
71
Joelle Anne Moreno, Extralegal Supreme Court Policy-Making, 24 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 451, 513–14 (2015) (stating there is “overwhelming scientific support and nearconsensus in the relevant medical community of pediatric healthcare” that shaking a baby can
be fatal); Joelle Moreno & Brian Holmgren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There
is No Abusive Head Trauma / Shaken Baby Syndrome “Scientific” Controversy, 2013 UTAH
L. REV. 1357 (2013) (noting that in Cavazos v. Smith, supra, the prosecution relied in part on
testimony about SBS; on the one hand, the majority of the Court upheld the legal sufficiency
of the evidence to support the conviction; on the other hand, in a dissent joined by Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg asserted that “doubt has increased in the medical
community whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone”; the dissenters cited
several papers as support for their assertion; the authors presented a detailed critique of the
papers cited by the dissent; the authors concluded that the dissenters were “uninformed” and
“promote[d] a false controversy”).
68

IMWINKELRIED (DO NOT DELETE)

1112

8/8/2018 1:39 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1095

This situation is distinguishable from the previous situation in which
the accused relies on an exculpatory exclusion or RMP, based on singlelocus probe RFLP, to attack prior expert testimony resting on multi-locus
probe RFLP analysis. It is true that in both situations, the outcome of the
subsequent scientific analysis is at odds with the prior testimony. In the
RFLP hypothetical, the single-locus probe result undercuts the RMP based
on a multi-locus probe analysis, just as a biomechanical expert’s testimony
could seemingly contradict a pediatrician’s opinion based on SBS.
However, there are two differences between the hypotheticals. First, in
the RFLP hypothetical, at the post-conviction stage, the defense experts can
mount a direct attack on the methodology employed at trial by the
prosecution expert; the prosecution expert had no right to use the
multiplication or product rule absent proof of the independence of the
markers. In the SBS hypothetical, the defense biomechanical experts make
an essentially indirect attack on the prosecution expert’s methodology; the
thrust of the defense’s argument is that since the prosecution expert’s
methodology yields different outcomes than the biomechanical analysis, the
differing outcomes imply that the prosecution expert’s methodology is
flawed.72
Second, although many studies demonstrate the validity of the
methodology of single-locus probe RFLP analysis, there are doubts about
the methodology used by the defense biomechanical experts. To be sure, the
defense experts have every right to question the studies used by the
pediatricians and pathologists subscribing to SBS. The prosecution experts
can point to documented cases of fatal brain injury without evidence of
striking, but it is fallacious to leap to the conclusion that there was no striking
in those cases:

72
The fact that technique number two yields a conclusion contrary to the conclusion
produced by technique number one indirectly calls into question the methodology supporting
technique number one. It is true that in Daubert, Justice Blackmun cautioned trial judges that
in passing on admissibility, “[t]he focus . . . must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions they generate.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
595 (1993). However, in Joiner, the Court stated that “conclusions and methodology are not
entirely distinct from one another.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). If
the new technique has been validated and consistently produces conclusions at odds with the
conclusions yielded by the prior technique, there is circumstantial—but not direct—evidence
that the methodology underlying the prior technique is unreliable. The Advisory Committee
Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 approvingly quotes In re Paoli Railroad
Yard PCB Litigation. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment
(quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Proponents do
not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments
of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate . . . that their opinions are
reliable . . . . The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of
correctness.”)).
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[T]he caregiver could easily be traumatized by the event; and as a
consequence, he or she might experience amnesia or “defensive
forgetting” of any impact. A loving parent’s recollection of their
child’s head accidentally striking an object or wall might be a
painful memory that the parent would want to repress. On the
alternative assumption that the caregiver acted in bad faith, in
order to minimize his or her culpability the caregiver might
deliberately withhold the detail that they struck the child’s head
against an object or surface.73
But for their part, the prosecution experts can criticize the defense’s
biomechanical studies. Medical ethics preclude shaking or striking infants
in controlled experiments. The result is that we know little about the infant
neck and brain. Consequently, we cannot be confident that the defense
studies utilizing primates or anthropomorphic models accurately
approximate infant physiology.74
In the RFLP hypothetical, the defense experts not only employ a
validated, single-locus probe RFLP methodology, but can also advance a
direct criticism of multi-locus probe methodology employed by the
prosecution expert at the earlier trial. In the instant case, there are common
sense doubts about the defense expert’s own methodology. Further, even if
the results of the biomechanical studies are accepted at face value, the studies
merely indirectly raise questions about the methodology employed by the
prosecution experts. This controversy amounts to a genuine battle of the
experts.75 It was therefore defensible for the Ninth Circuit to conclude in
Gimenez that the later biomechanical studies do not thoroughly discredit or
invalidate the prosecution expert’s SBS testimony at the prior trial.
4. Subsequent Research That Falls Short of Thoroughly
Discrediting the Prior Expert Testimony But Seriously
Undermines Confidence in the Testimony
In the prior variation of the state of the record, although the new
biomechanical studies point to a different conclusion than the SBS theory,
there are doubts about the studies themselves. There are questions about the
reliability of extrapolating76 from studies using primates and models to
inferences about human infants. However, contrast the following variation.
Suppose that as in the case of the SBS, the new scientific technique yields
different outcomes than the technique employed in the prior expert
73
74
75
76

Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 174.
Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 175–80.
Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 200.
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
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testimony, thereby at least indirectly raising doubts the prior expert’s
methodology. But now the new technique has been more convincingly
validated than the biomechanical analysis. That is the case with hair analysis.
Assume that at the prior trial, the prosecution presented testimony about
microscopic hair analysis.77 In the past, hair analysts have frequently
overstated the probative value of a finding that two hair samples—perhaps
one from the crime scene and another from the defendant’s person—were
microscopically indistinguishable. In an analysis of 268 cases involving
testimony about microscopic hair analysis, the F.B.I. found that 257
transcripts—96% of the cases—included exaggerated testimony about the
significance of a match.78 Twenty-six of the twenty-seven examiners made
such statements.79 In its 2009 report on forensic science, the National
Research Council harshly criticized microscopic hair analysts’ use of
language that expressly or implicitly indicates that a particular person was
the source of a hair sample.80 In its 2016 report, the President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology reviewed the black box studies of
microscopic hair analysis and found them wanting.81
Assume further that after trial, defense experts conducted a
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) test that excluded the accused. In an F.B.I.
study of eighty hair comparisons in which microscopic analysts reported
matches or associations, mtDNA analysis demonstrated that nine samples
(12.5%) came from different persons.82 In short, just as the biomechanical
analysts sometimes reach different outcomes than pathologists relying on
SBS, molecular biologists employing mtDNA can come to a different
conclusion than a microscopic hair analyst. Would defense testimony about
the mtDNA test result justify a new trial? Here the answer should be Yes.
The courts have repeatedly ruled that mtDNA analyses are admissible under
77

Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 24.02[l]. See also Fabricant & Carrington, supra note
13, at 63–92.
78
Norman L. Reimer, The Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review Project: A
Milestone in the Quest for Forensic Science Reform, 39 CHAMPION 9 (May 2015).
79
Id. See also Ryan & Adams, supra note 14, at 1084; Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits
Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingto
npost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-fordecades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510962fcfabc310_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e7b2cecff4c1.
80
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH FORWARD 5–25 (2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD].
81
PCAST, supra note 13, at 118–23 (noting that in one study, the test conditions did not
come close to approximating normal casework where “the examiner . . . knew that all hairs
being examined came from different individuals;” and in another study, half of the declared
matches were false positives).
82
A PATH FORWARD, supra note 80, at 25–26 (citing Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle,
Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI.
964 (2002)).
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Daubert.83 Given the extent of the empirical validation of mtDNA
methodology,84 a court can have far more confidence in an mtDNA exclusion
than in a biomechanical analysis concluding that shaking did not cause an
infant’s death.
One court has already granted post-conviction relief in a hair case. In
2016 in Commonwealth v. Perrott,85 a Hampden County, Massachusetts
Superior Court granted the accused a new trial. At the prior trial, an FBI
expert testified about hair analysis. He conducted a microscopic analysis of
the samples with respect to such characteristics as color, the medulla, the
cuticle, the cortex, scales, and pigment arrangement. He opined that the hair
samples “matched” in all respects and were “microscopically
indistinguishable.” The expert conceded that microscopic hair analysis
cannot yield an absolute personal identification. However, he added that a
match in so many respects was evidence of a “strong association.”
Elaborating, he asserted that “it’s my experience in 10 years it’s extremely
rare I will have known hair samples from two different people I can’t tell
apart.” In awarding a new trial, the judge approvingly cited the 2009 NRC
report. Even assuming that the F.B.I. mtDNA hair study and the 2009 NRC
report do not completely discredit microscopic hair analysis, in such cases
the accused should be accorded a new trial when there is a subsequent
mtDNA exclusion. Evidence of an exclusion seriously diminishes
confidence in the accuracy of the prior expert hair testimony.86 In the
microscopic technique, the pigment of the hair is determined by the
subjective judgment of the microscopist. In mtDNA, the color of the dye is
determined by a laser scanner whose accuracy has been tested and measured.
Although the biomechanical studies raise some doubt about the validity of
the SBS hypothesis, here the mtDNA evidence has a more profound effect.
In the words of a Mississippi court, the subsequent evidence undermines
confidence in the correctness of the earlier testimony.87
What general standard emerges from the above analysis? It is
submitted that an accused ought to be entitled to a new trial when: (1) the
accused presents testimony about a new analytic technique developed in
83

Giannelli et al., supra note 52, §§ 18.02[b], 18.05[a][1].
Id. § 18.03[e]. The validation studies break the process down into its various stages—
extraction, amplification, and sequencing—and attempt to establish objective standards for
each step. Id.
85
Commonwealth v. Perrott, Nos. 85-5415, 5416, 5418, 5420, 5425, 2016 WL 380123
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2016). See Lizzy McLellan, Getting a Conviction Overturned
Without DNA, NAT’L L.J. 38 (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/n
ationallawjournal/2017/04/03/getting-a-conviction-overturned-withoutdna/?slreturn=20180124162524.
86
The Supreme Court used similar language in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313
(1989).
87
Yarborough v. State, 514 So.2d 1215 (Miss. 1987).
84
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subsequent scientific research; (2) that technique yields a different outcome
than the expert technique used at the prior trial; and (3) the validation of the
new technique is so extensive that it either discredits the prior expert
testimony or seriously undermines confidence in its correctness. At the most
recent meeting of the American Bar Association, the Criminal Justice
Section’s report to the House of Delegates proposed a resolution that
defendants be entitled to post-conviction relief when forensic evidence
presented at the earlier trial has been “undermined or discredited” by
subsequent scientific research. As we shall see in subpart B, subsequent
empirical research discredited Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA)
by exposing a fatal weakness in an essential premise of the technique; the
research demonstrated that contrary to the FBI experts’ claims, the elemental
composition of a batch of bullet production (a single day’s production at a
particular manufacturing plant) is not unique and uniform. As we have
already seen, the advent of mtDNA testing seriously undermined
microscopic hair analysis; given the findings in the black box studies of the
latter technique, the validation studies of mtDNA provide a solid empirical
basis for preferring the mtDNA result whenever the mtDNA result is at odds
with a microscopist’s claim that a person was the source of the hair tested.
The Constitution may not mandate a new trial in these circumstances.
However, the American criminal justice is intensely concerned about the
reliability of the evidence it relies on to justify convictions, and the proposed
general standard operationalizes that concern.
B. Illustrative Fact Situations Satisfying the General Standard
Part III.A proposed a general standard for granting new trials based on
subsequent scientific developments. This Part attempts to identify specific
fact situations in which an accused ought to be entitled to relief under this
standard.
Before attempting to do so, though, it is important to appreciate the
general structure of a prosecution expert’s direct testimony. Commentators
sometimes refer to the “use”—in the singular—of an expert at trial. In truth,
an expert can be used in a variety of ways.88 Although there are other
88
An expert can give purely factual testimony under Rule 602. FED. R. EVID. 602.
Suppose that while driving, an eminently qualified toxicologist witnessed a car run through a
red light and crash into another vehicle. The toxicologist may possess a Ph.D. that qualifies
him or her as an expert under Rule 702, but that does not preclude him or her from giving
factual testimony based on perception. FED. R. EVID. 702. Alternatively, assume that after
witnessing the accident, the toxicologist walked toward a driver’s car. When the driver exited,
the toxicologist noticed that the driver’s eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and his
breath had a strong alcohol odor. Like any competent witness under Rule 701, the toxicologist
could testify to a lay opinion that the driver was intoxicated. FED. R. EVID. 701. Finally,
suppose that at the driver’s trial for drunk driving, the prosecution has already called a police
officer to testify about the result of an intoxilyzer test administered to the driver at the accident
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legitimate uses of an expert witness under the Federal Rules, in most cases
when a litigant calls an expert, the litigant wants the expert to testify in the
form of a syllogism.89 The proponent of a psychiatrist’s testimony might call
the witness solely to testify in general terms about the set of symptoms that,
according to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual V,90 is diagnostic for a certain mental disorder. However,
the proponent usually desires more from the psychiatrist; the proponent
typically wants the psychiatrist to apply the diagnostic criteria to a particular
person’s case history and opine whether the person suffers from that mental
disorder. In the final analysis, the psychiatrist’s testimony is syllogistic in
structure. After testifying to the credentials that qualify the witness as an
expert, the expert: states the diagnostic criteria, the general technique or
theory (the major premise); describes the patient’s case history (the minor
premise); applies the major premise to the minor; and finally derives a
conclusion whether the patient’s symptomatology meets the criteria.
The provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulate each element
of the witness’s testimony:




Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that in order to qualify
as an expert, the witness must possess “knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education.”
Federal Rule 702(c) states that the expert’s major premise must
consist of “reliable [general] principles and methods.”
The rules impose two restrictions on the witness’s minor
premise. Rule 702(b) decrees that the minor premise must
include “sufficient facts or data.” Rule 703 adds qualitative
restrictions. Under Rule 703, the facts included in the minor
premise must: (a) be based on the witness’s firsthand
knowledge, e.g., a physician’s personal observation of a
wound; (b) rest on admissible testimony of every element of a
hypothetical question; or (c) be premised on secondhand, outof-court reports if it is the specialty’s reasonable/customary

scene. If the toxicologist takes the stand, under Rule 702 the toxicologist could “give a
dissertation or exposition of [the] scientific . . . principles” underlying the intoxilyzer. FED.
R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. The note explains that the
committee included the wording, “in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” to permit such
general testimony. Id. The note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 refers to
“the venerable practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general
principles.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
89
See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The
Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988).
90
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
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practice to consider reports from such sources.
Rule 702(d) requires a showing that the expert “reliably applied
the principles and methods [the major premise] to the facts of
the case [the minor premise].”
Rule 704 relates to the phrasing of the witness’s ultimate
conclusion or opinion.

The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to
Rule 702 states that “any step that renders the analysis unreliable . . . [can]
render[] the expert’s testimony inadmissible.”91 “Any step” should be
interpreted as including all five components of the expert’s testimony: the
witness’s status as an expert, the validity of the witness’s major premise, the
trustworthiness of the information about the case-specific facts constituting
the minor premise, the manner in which the witness applied the major
premise to the minor, and the formation of the final opinion. As we shall
now see, a post-conviction scientific development affecting any of these five
components could conceivably satisfy the proposed general standard for
awarding a new trial.
1. The Witness’s Status as an Expert
In a disturbing number of cases, post-conviction investigation has
revealed that witnesses called as experts have misstated—usually
overstated—their credentials.92 If the witness had accurately described his
or her credentials, he or she might not have qualified as an expert at all; or
his or her credentials could have paled in comparison to the actual credentials
of an opposing expert. In either case, the false testimony might have affected
the outcome of the trial.
However, far more often than not, it will not be subsequent scientific
research that exposes the falsity of the witness’s prior testimony about their
credentials. Rather, it will be ordinary fact investigation such as contacting
the educational institution that supposedly awarded the witness a Ph.D. That
type of investigation does not produce new scientific evidence. Furthermore,
the potential discoverability of that information at the time of the prior trial
91

FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (quoting In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir 1994)). See also Iannece, supra note 12, at
232.
92
In the District of Columbia, there was a scandal over the lies by one government
expert, Johnny St. Valentine Brown, about his credentials. United States v. Williams, 233
F.3d 592 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Spinner, 109 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d,
22 Fed. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Jones, 84 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 1999);
David E. Rovella, D.C. Cop’s Lies Taint Trials, NAT’L L.J. (2000). See also United States v.
Gale, 326 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (a government narcotics expert misrepresented his
academic credentials).
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suggests that any post-conviction claim based on the discovery will lend
itself more readily to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.93
However, there can be exceptional cases in which later scientific
research discredits this element of the witness’s testimony or seriously
undermines confidence in the witness’s qualification as an expert. Suppose
that at an earlier homicide trial years before, the prosecution called a witness
to testify about bloodstain pattern analysis (BPA). Initially, the courts
routinely accepted testimony on that subject from police officers who had
been trained by showing them photographs or drawings of patterns that were
supposedly caused by a certain type of blood shedding event.94 In the early
cases, as a matter of course the courts permitted such testimony even if the
witness lacked a scientific background. Some courts were satisfied by
testimony that the officer had attended a two-week training course on the
subject.95 In the intervening years, though, physicists turned their attention
to bloodstain pattern analysis.96 Thanks to their research, today we have a
much more sophisticated understanding of the behavior of blood. For
example, we now know that unlike water, blood behaves like a nonNewtonian fluid97 and that its viscosity has a direct effect on its behavior.98
A strong case can be made that only a witness with an understanding of
physics, in particular, the significance of blood viscosity, is competent to
opine about bloodstain pattern analysis. Assume that at the time of trial it
was well settled that a police officer with minimal training could testify about
bloodstain pattern analysis. In a post-conviction proceeding the defense can
argue that subsequent studies of bloodstain patterns by physicists seriously
undermine confidence in a pattern analysis by anyone lacking a knowledge
of even the rudiments of physics.99
93

See supra, notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 24.13(a).
95
Id. In the state conviction involved in Smith v. Massey, the witness was permitted to
testify although his training course lasted only one week. Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259
(10th Cir. 2000).
96
Id. § 24.12.
97
Id. § 24.12, at 878. See also ANITA Y. WONDER, BLOODSTAIN PATTERN EVIDENCE:
OBJECTIVE APPROACHES AND CASE APPLICATIONS ch. 3 (2007); Aaron D. Gopen & Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Bloodstain Pattern Evidence Revisited, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 485 (2009).
98
Id. (noting that rheology is the study of non-Newtonian fluids).
99
Of course, in these cases, it will often be possible to conceptualize the fact situation as
one in which the expert used an invalid major premise. For instance, in the above bloodstain
pattern analysis hypothetical, the defense could argue that at the prior trial, the expert relied
on the primitive methodology of comparing the crime scene bloodstain to a pattern in a binder
that the officer received in his or her training course. The defense could then argue that
subsequent scientific research has demonstrated that the only way to reliably analysis such
patterns is to apply the laws of physics. Even if the fact situation is not reconceptualized, the
defense will have a strong argument that the attack has the requisite impact on the prior
verdict. If the original court should have ruled the witness unqualified as an expert, none of
94
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2. The Witness’s Major Premise: The General Technique or
Theory the Witness Is Relying On
As previously stated, after the witness’s proponent establishes the
witness’s status as an expert, the proponent next may attempt to elicit the
witness’s description of the general technique or theory that the witness
contemplates using to evaluate the significance of the case-specific facts.
This is the component of the witness’s testimony at the prior trial that can be
most directly discredited by subsequent scientific research. The history of
forensic science is littered with theories that once enjoyed judicial
acceptance but have since been exposed as “junk science.”
Two notorious examples will suffice. First, at one time, forensic
scientists used the paraffin test to determine whether a person had recently
discharged a firearm.100 The paraffin method tested the sample for the
presence of nitrate residues.101 However, later research revealed that nitrates
are so common that the paraffin method was very susceptible to false positive
results.102 That revelation led most crime laboratories to abandon the use of
the paraffin test.103 Second, in many cases, the forensic scientist is not
interested in whether a particular person fired a weapon. Rather, the crucial
question is whether a bullet was discharged from a particular handgun or
rifle.104 In the typical case, the prosecution analyst microscopically analyzes
the striations on the bullet and attempts to match them to the striations of
other bullets fired from the same weapon.105 However, suppose that the
crime scene bullet is so deformed that it is impossible to visualize striations.
Until relatively recently, in such cases the FBI sometimes conducted
Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA).106 The analyst used inductively
the witness’s purportedly expert testimony would have been admitted. If the prosecution
needed the expert testimony to sustain its initial burden of production at the prior trial, the
judge should have directed a verdict or entered an acquittal judgment as a matter of law. Even
if the remaining evidence made out a submissible case for the jury, the complete exclusion of
the expert testimony will often make a defense verdict much more probable.
100
Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a).
101
Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a).
102
Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a) (noting that there were false positive
reactions with tobacco, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, leguminous plants, and urine).
103
Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1224 (1980).
104
Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis
(CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inferences or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43 (2003).
105
The 2016 PCAST report flatly asserts that this methodology lacks foundational
validity. PCAST, supra note 13, at 112. However, assume for purposes of argument that that
technique is sufficiently reliable. As we shall see, the reliability of Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis (CBLA) is a different question. Even if striation analysis is sufficiently reliable,
CBLA has been exposed as junk science. See Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104.
106
Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104.

IMWINKELRIED (DO NOT DELETE)

8/8/2018 1:39 PM

2018] DEBUNKED, DISCREDITED, BUT STILL DEFENDED

1121

coupled plasma atomic (or optical) emission spectroscopy (ICP-AES or ICPOES) to analyze the elemental composition of the crime scene bullet and
other bullets connected to the suspect such as ammunition found at the
suspect’s residence. The analyst evaluated the bullets for the presence of
several elements, including antimony, bismuth, and cadmium.107 When the
analysis indicated that the bullets contained the same elements in the similar
minute quantities, many courts allowed FBI experts to testify that the bullets
came from the same batch (a day’s production at a manufacturing plant), the
same shipment delivered to a retailer where the accused purchased bullets,
or even the same box of bullets found in the accused’s home.108 Even if the
expert gave the most limited opinion (the same batch), the opinion rested on
the premise that each day’s batch is not only unique but also uniform in
composition.109
Later studies of the bullet manufacturing process
demonstrated that this premise was unfounded.110 Given those studies, in
2004 the National Research Council released a report concluding that CBLA
lacked scientific validity.111 Together, the report and the studies so
thoroughly undermined CBLA that the FBI discontinued the use of the
technique.112 In the preceding BPA example, the defense arguably satisfies
the “seriously undermine” prong of the proposed general standard. This case
is an even stronger case for relief, since it can be said that the subsequent
research triggers the “discredited” prong.
3. The Witness’s Minor Premise: The Sources of the
Witness’s Information About the Case-Specific Facts That
the Witness Will Apply the General Technique or Theory to
After eliciting the witness’s description and validation of the major
premise, the witness’s proponent may ask the witness to identify the casespecific facts that serve as the minor premise. As previously stated, under
Federal Rule 703, the expert can rely on three different sources for
information about those facts:113 (i) the expert personally observed the fact;
(ii) prior witnesses have provided admissible testimony about the facts, and
the proponent includes those facts in a hypothetical question posed to the
expert; or (iii) the expert relied on a secondhand, out-of-court report if
experts in the same field “reasonably” rely on that type of report.

107
108
109
110
111

Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 48.
Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 44–45.
Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 50–54.
Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 50–54.
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE

(2004).
112
113

Giannelli et al., supra note 52, at 795–96.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
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In the typical post-conviction proceeding in which the accused attacks
the truth of these facts, the basis for the attack is not subsequent scientific
research. As in the case of the usual post-conviction attack on the earlier
witness’s expert status, the accused will rely on evidence unearthed during a
normal fact investigation. At trial, the psychiatric expert might have relied
on prior lay testimony or a secondhand report that the accused was coherent
immediately after the shooting. A later factual investigation unearths
substantial evidence that instead, the accused was incoherent and behaving
in a highly irrational manner. In this situation, in the post-conviction
proceeding the court would apply the normal standards for false lay
testimony.
i.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702(b)

In other cases, subsequent scientific research may impact the minor
premise; but it will frequently be possible to view the later development as
impacting the major premise. By way of example, consider psychiatric
testimony. For some disorders, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
prescribes inclusionary criteria, that is, case-specific symptoms.114 At the
time of the earlier trial, the DSM may have required only two relevant
symptoms. At trial, there was evidence of two—but only two—symptoms
that permitted the expert to opine that the patient suffered from the disorder.
However, later research persuades the psychiatric community to revise the
standard and require three symptoms. The application of that standard to the
minor premise at the prior trial would have resulted in the exclusion of the
expert testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 702(b) states that the expert’s
opinion must be “based on sufficient facts or data;” and in light of the revised
standard, the minor premise is now insufficient.
In these cases, though, the facts can just as readily be viewed as the
subsequent invalidation of the witness’s major premise. At the prior trial,
the witness relied on the theory that the presence of two symptoms was
sufficient to justify the diagnosis. The subsequent research undercut that
premise; the new research superseded the prior theory and supplanted it with
a new major premise that the diagnosis requires three symptoms.
ii.

Federal Rule of Evidence 703

However, in still other cases, later scientific research could impact only
the minor premise but still conceivably warrant a new trial. Some courts
construe Rule 703’s language governing secondhand reports as requiring a
114

Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 415 (1987) (discussing the research that led to the development of
Feighner Criteria now included as inclusionary or exclusionary criteria for some of the
disorders listed in the DSM-5).
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showing that it is a customary practice within the expert’s specialty to
consider that type of information in forming opinions.115 Suppose that at the
prior trial, an arson expert testified to the opinion that an accelerant had been
poured at the fire scene. In forming that opinion, the expert relied heavily
on lay witnesses’ description of the color of the smoke emanating from the
burning building.116 At trial, the expert accurately testified that arson experts
routinely relied on such lay reports. However, after trial, new research
demonstrates that lay witnesses’ color opinions are an unreliable indicator of
the presence of an accelerant. Lacking any training in fire science, most
laypersons do not make the nuanced color differentiations necessary to
detect the shades of smoke caused by accelerants—as opposed to the colors
caused by other fire fuel.117 The new research calls the reliability of an
opinion based solely on largely such secondhand lay reports into serious
doubt. In retrospect, the subsequent research would have precluded the
expert at the earlier trial from opining that an accelerant was present.
4. The Application of the Major Premise to the Minor Premise
Rule 702(d) announces that proof of proper test procedure is a separate,
required element of the foundation for expert testimony. That requirement
is sensible, since numerous proficiency studies suggest that improper test
procedure is the leading cause of flawed testimony.118 Even when the
witness, a Nobel Laureate, is using an exquisitely validated technique, the
opinion can be unsound if the witness used sloppy, hurried procedure in
applying the technique to the case-specific data.
Subsequent scientific developments may call into question the
procedure used at the time of the earlier trial. In re Richards,119 a 2016
California Supreme Court decision, illustrates the importance of changed
procedure. Richards involved forensic odontology, bitemark analysis. At
the original trial, the prosecution odontologist testified on the basis of an
autopsy photograph. The expert stated that a lesion on the victim’s hand,
shown in the photograph, was a bitemark. Before and at trial, the expert
115
Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony: Fed. R. Evid. 702 to 705 Primer;
Hypothetical Question Discretionary Use, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 1460, 1467 (2016).
116
Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 26.04(c).
117
The Law Revision Commission Comment to California Evidence Code § 801 points
out that under prior case law, Behr v. County of Santa Cruz, 342 P.2d 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959), it was error to permit a fire expert to rely on lay bystanders’ reports about the fire.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966).
118
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Proper Procedure in Conducting Scientific
Testing: Healing the Achilles Heel of Forensic Science, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 371–73 (2007)
(collecting proficiency studies finding that improper test procedure was a common cause of
error).
119
In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016). See Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13,
at 38–63 (discussing bitemark analysis).
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relied on his visual inspection of the photograph. Later, other experts in the
field developed new computer software to digitally eliminate angular
distortion in such photographs. The digital technology was not available at
the time of the original trial. In a post-conviction proceeding, using the
digital technology, defense experts testified that the lesion either was not a
bitemark or at the very least did not match the accused’s dentition. Presented
with the results of the new procedure for analyzing the photograph, the
original prosecution expert testified “I don’t know for sure that . . . that
photograph depicts a bitemark” and that if it was a bitemark, “[petitioner’s]
teeth . . . are not consistent with the lesion . . . .” Even in the mind of the
original prosecution witness, the advent of the new procedure significantly
undermined confidence in the initial opinion.
This basis for subsequently invalidating prior expert testimony is likely
to come into play more frequently in the future. In 2014, the Organization
of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) was created under the aegis of the
Department of Justice and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.120
There are six general OSAC Committees and 23
Subcommittees in such diverse areas as anthropology, digital evidence,
DNA, explosives, friction ridge, and questioned documents.121 One of the
principal purposes of the subcommittees is to promulgate new standards and
guidelines for conducting forensic tests.122 Even in the short term, we may
see a substantial number of new procedures designed to apply techniques and
theories in a more standardized, systematic fashion. The promulgation of
these standards may be accompanied by commentary, marshaling new
research that sharply questions the reliability of the prior methods of
applying the techniques and theories. If so, as in Richards the defense may
have a plausible claim that the issuance of the new procedure significantly
undermines confidence in the procedure employed at the time of the earlier
trial.
5. The Witness’s Final Conclusion or Opinion
One of the contemporary refrains in the critiques of forensic science is
that forensic witnesses often overstate the degree of definiteness of their
opinion. In its 2009 report, the National Research Council took many
fingerprint examiners to task on this ground. As the report noted, in the past
examiners have frequently

120

The Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/forensics/organization-scientificarea-committees (updated Apr. 11, 2018).
121
Id.
122
Id.
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claim[ed] that they have matched the latent print to the one and
only person in the entire world whose fingertip could have
produced it. Given the general lack of validity testing for
fingerprinting, the relative dearth of difficult proficiency tests . . .,
and the lack of validated standard for declaring a match, such
claims of absolute, certain confidence in identification are
unjustified. Therefore, in order to pass scrutiny under Daubert,
fingerprint identification experts should exhibit a greater degree
of epistemological humility. Claims of “absolute” and “positive”
identification should be replaced by more modest claims . . . .123
The 2016 PCAST report reiterated the criticism:
Statements suggesting or implying greater certainty are not
scientifically valid and should not be permitted. In particular,
courts should never permit scientifically indefensible claims such
as: “zero,” “vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “negligible,”
“minimal,” or “microscopic” error rates; “100 percent certainty”
or proof “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty;”
identification “to the exclusion of all other sources;” or a chance
of error so remote as to be a “practical” impossibility.124
However, it is a mistake to leap to the conclusion that the presentation of
exaggerated testimony at the prior trial necessarily warrants a new trial based
on changed science. In many instances, if the defense counsel had diligently
investigated the issue, he or she would have discovered the overstatement.
The counsel might have been able to successfully expose the overstatement
by cross-examination and the presentation of contrary expert testimony. In
short, as Part II noted, the fact situation might be ripe for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
In other cases, though, the defense may have a meritorious claim for a
new trial based on changed science. At the time of the earlier trial, the
scientific community may have not appreciated that the claims were
exaggerated, or the legal community may not have had reasonable access to
the science needed to expose the exaggeration. Post-conviction scientific
research may be responsible for the subsequent realization that the prior
testimony was overstated.
Consider the case of blood or breath alcohol concentrations in drunkdriving prosecutions. In the past, the courts routinely allowed a police officer
who had administered a breath test or a toxicologist who had conducted a
123
124

A PATH FORWARD, supra note 80, at 5–12.
PCAST, supra note 13, at 19.
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laboratory test to provide the jury with a single point estimate of the
accused’s concentration.125 Especially when presented with only a single
figure by a witness with scientific credentials, lay jurors are likely to treat
the estimate as an exact value. However, in the last decade the legal
community has begun to understand the importance of metrology, the
science of measurement. The basic tenet of metrology is that no
measurement is certain. No matter how carefully the analyst conducts the
measurement and no matter how well calibrated the measuring instrument
is, the analyst can never be certain that he or she has captured the true value
of the measure.126 It is sound metrological practice to provide the decisionmaker with both the estimate and an arithmetic measure of the estimate’s
uncertainty. In its 2009 report, the National Research Council recommended
that “[a]ll results of every forensic science method . . . indicate the
uncertainty in the measurements that are made.”127 In particular, the jury can
be given a confidence interval for the estimate—a range with upper and
lower boundaries.128 The additional testimony about the interval gives the
trier a sense of the imprecision of the estimate.
A Washington state drunk driving case illustrates the dramatic impact
that the provision of testimony about a confidence interval can have.129 In
Washington, the per se limit for drunk driving is a blood-alcohol
concentration (BAC) of 0.08%. In that case, the BAC reading, 0.081%,
exceeded the limit. The reading was marginal, just barely exceeding the
0.08% limit. Nevertheless, based on the reading, on direct examination a
toxicologist initially testified that the accused had violated the per se statute.
However, during cross-examination the defense counsel presented the
toxicologist with evidence that with a 99% level of confidence, the interval
for the reading ranged from 0.00731 to 0.0877. The defense counsel then
submitted an exhibit to the court. The middle of the exhibit had a vertical
line representing the 0.08% threshold. The exhibit then superimposed a
normal, Bell Curve distribution showing the interval. The distribution was
anchored on the reading, 0.081; the midpoint of the distribution was 0.081—
to the right of the 0.08 limit. However, 44% of the area under the curve fell
125

See generally TED VOSK & ASHLEY F. EMERY, FORENSIC METROLOGY: SCIENTIFIC
MEASUREMENT AND INFERENCE FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND CRIMINALISTS (2015); see also
Ted Vosk & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Measurements in Forensic Science—Of Errors and
Uncertainty, 53 CRIM. L. BULL. 532 (2017).
126
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of Forensic Metrology in Preventing
Miscarriages of Justice: Intellectual Honesty About the Uncertainty of Measurement in
Scientific Analysis, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 333, 340 (2014).
127
A PATH FORWARD, supra note 80, at 184.
128
Donald P. Land & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Confidence Intervals: How Much
Confidence Should the Courts Have in Testimony About a Sample Statistic?, 44 CRIM. L.
BULL. 257 (2008).
129
VOSK & EMERY, supra note 125, at 169–71.
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to the left below the 0.08 limit. The exhibit, visually depicting the coverage
interval, was powerful evidence that there was a reasonable doubt as to
whether the accused had driven in violation of the statute. The legal
community is just beginning to realize the pertinence of metrology in general
and intervals in particular. There are only a few opinions on point.130
Now, suppose that the direct testimony about the 0.081% reading had
been presented at a prior trial that resulted in a conviction. The defense later
discovered the pertinence of metrology. At the defense’s request, a
toxicologist later computed the interval for the estimate in the prior case.
Almost half of the area of the curve fell below the 0.08% threshold.
Concededly, the new evidence about the interval does not completely
discredit the earlier testimony. However, the evidence would seriously
undermine a rational decision-maker’s confidence in the earlier testimony
that the accused’s BAC exceeded 0.08%.
In short, like changed science with respect to every other essential
component of the prosecution expert’s testimony, new science relating to the
definiteness of the opinion could satisfy the proposed general standard for
granting a new trial. As a practical matter, though, it may be more difficult
to obtain a new trial on this ground. In many cases in which the subsequent
scientific research affects one of the other four components of the prior
expert’s testimony, the new scientific evidence might have resulted in the
exclusion of the prosecution expert testimony at the prior trial. The new
science could have led to a different qualification standard, and the
prosecution witness might have been barred from giving any expert
testimony. Alternatively, the changed science could have discredited the
witness’s major premise to the degree that the judge might have altogether
excluded the witness’s testimony. Here, though, the new scientific research
would simply have prevented the prosecution expert from overstating the
definiteness of his or her opinion. The trier would still have heard the other
components of the witness’s testimony. As Part II noted, obtaining postconviction relief is a both/and proposition: The defense must demonstrate
both the impact of the new science on the prior expert testimony and the
impact of the attack on that testimony on the verdict. It will be harder to
make the latter showing when the new scientific studies affect only the
definiteness of the expert’s conclusion.

130
See State v. King Cty. Dist. Court W. Div., 307 P.3d 765, 766–70 (Wash. Ct. App.
2013). See also People v. Jabrocki, No. 08-5461-FD (Mich. Dist. Ct. May 6, 2011),
http://www.ncids.com/forensic/metrology/Jabrocki.pdf (noting an uncertainty budget).
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CAN WE BE CONFIDENT THAT WHEN AN ACCUSED SHOULD BE
ENTITLED TO RELIEF DUE TO CHANGED SCIENCE, RELIEF WILL
BE AVAILABLE UNDER THE EXISTING POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF STATUTES?

Part III.A proposed a general standard for deciding when, as a matter
of policy, later scientific research so discredits prior expert testimony or
seriously undermines confidence in the testimony that the interest in reliable
verdicts overrides finality. Part III.B then identified five situations in which
changed science can have that effect. Now the question is whether an
accused with such a claim can obtain a remedy. All 50 states have statutes
regulating one or more forms of post-conviction relief.131 Furthermore, as
Part II noted, a few states such as California and Texas have recently
amended their statutes to provide relief when later scientific research
invalidates expert testimony admitted at a prior trial. Is adequate relief
available under the existing general statutes? If not, could the new California
and Texas statutes serve as drafting models? If not, how should the existing
statutes be amended to provide relief to accused with the types of claims
described in Part III.B?
A. The Availability of a Remedy Under the Current Post-Conviction
Relief Statutes
The early state statutes had a very narrow scope. They allowed postconviction relief if the convicting court lacked jurisdiction.132 The
legislatures gradually broadened the scope of the legislation.133 The
legislatures extended the reach of the statutes to cover constitutional
violations on the theory that a constitutional violation rendered the
conviction void.134 Eventually the scope of the statutes was expanded to
recognize certain types of non-constitutional grounds.135 For instance,
California Penal Code Section 1473 allows relief when the prior conviction
rested on “false evidence.”
If a jurisdiction recognizes “false evidence” as a basis for relief, can we
be confident that accused with the sorts of claims identified in Part III.B will
obtain a new trial? Unfortunately, the answer is No.

131

Wilkes, supra note 15, § 1:7; Ryan & Adams, supra note 14, at 1105; Note, State PostConviction Remedies, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 681 (1961) [hereinafter Note].
132
Note, supra note 131, at 689–90, 692, 703.
133
Note, supra note 131, at 689.
134
Note, supra note 131, at 689–90, 697, 703.
135
Note, supra note 131, at 689, 698.
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1. Untruthful Testimony
Some courts have construed the expression, “false evidence,” as
requiring a showing that the witness at the prior trial gave untruthful
testimony—in other words, forensic fraud.136 A classic illustration is the
infamous case of Fred Zain.137 Zain had worked as a serologist in several
states, including West Virginia. The official investigation into his
misconduct reached the following findings:
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included: (1)
overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of
genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting
the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence;
(4) reporting that multiple items had been tested, when only a
single item of evidence had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive
results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory records;
(7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic
markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to
report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report
conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results; (10)
implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a
match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible
or improbable results.138
The investigation revealed a “long history of falsifying evidence.”139 The
investigating judge concluded that Zain’s “pattern and practice of
misconduct completely undermined the validity and reliability of any
forensic work he performed or reported.”140
In Zain’s case, the misconduct was so extreme and of such duration that
it was easy to find “false evidence” in the sense of untruthful testimony.
However, in the run-of-the-mill case in which experts disagree, the court is
likely to find “simply a difference in opinion—not [intentionally] false
testimony.”141 Even if in retrospect it is clear that the prior testimony was
overstated, the court is reluctant to infer that the earlier witness lied.142
Absent evidence of subornation of perjury or the falsification of

136

Iannece, supra note 12, at 232.
Gardner v. Ballard, 172 F. Supp. 3d 925 (S.D. W. Va. 2016).
138
Id. at 928 n.3 (citing In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology
Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1993)).
139
Id. at 927 (citing In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 503).
140
Id. at 928 (citing In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 504).
141
Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
142
Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 675 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2002).
137
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documents,143 the defense showing will probably fall short of justifying postconviction relief under the deliberately false evidence standard.
2. Objectively False Testimony
Part III referred to the California Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in In
re Richards.144 As Part III.B explained, there the court granted relief under
amended Penal Code Section 1473. The court found that new digital
technology eliminated the angular distortion in an autopsy photograph and
seriously undermined confidence in earlier trial testimony that a lesion on
the decedent’s hand was a bitemark.
While Richards eventually obtained relief in 2016, that opinion related
to his second habeas petition. The court denied his first petition.145 At the
time of that petition, Section 1473 had not yet been amended. The statute
did not incorporate the amendment addressing the impact of new scientific
evidence. Rather, the unamended statute required the defense to show “false
evidence.” In the opinion ruling on the initial petition, the majority of the
California Supreme Court read “false evidence” narrowly:
The majority in Richards I held that if an expert witness’s opinion
given at trial later changes without any significant advances in the
expert’s field of expertise or in any technologies employed by the
expert, “it would not be accurate to say that the witness’s opinion
at trial was false.” [T]he fact that an expert recants an opinion . . .
does not necessarily establish that the opinion at trial was false.
Instead, the expert’s change in opinion “has merely demonstrated
the subjective component of expert opinion testimony.” [T]he
“false evidence” standard under section 1473 [is] satisfied “[i]f,
and only if . . . an expert’s opinion stated at trial was objectively
untrue.”146
After the initial 2012 decision, the California legislature adopted Senate Bill
Number 1058 to amend Section 1473.147 The Senate analysis read Richards
I as interpreting “false evidence” in a manner that severely limited its
application to expert testimony:
The Richards . . . majority upheld petitioner’s conviction, holding
that “expert testimony is different from other types of expert
143

Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1143.
In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016). See supra text accompanying note 114; see
also Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35.
145
In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2012).
146
In re Richards, 371 P.3d at 202.
147
Id. at 207.
144
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testimony in that it is merely the opinion of the expert, not
evidence in and of itself, and so can never be [objectively] “true”
or “false.”148
The upshot is that if a court construed “false evidence” in a post-conviction
relief statute as requiring a showing of either subjectively untruthful
testimony or testimony that would be deemed false under Richards I, an
accused with one of the claims identified in Part III.B would probably not
obtain a remedy. It is true that the language, “false evidence,” is expansive
enough that a court could read it to render the claims listed in Part III.B
cognizable. However, these statutes have existed for decades,149 and during
that period, subsequent scientific research has overtaken numerous expert
techniques such as the paraffin test and the Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis (CBLA). If it is still unsettled whether “false evidence”
encompasses expert testimony invalidated by later scientific research, it is
unrealistic to think that a more liberal reading of the statutory terminology
will become uniform throughout the states in the near future. As the
Introduction noted, given the amount of ongoing forensic research
worldwide, in the near future the courts will have to grapple with the impact
of changed science in a large number of cases. Rather than wasting judicial
resources, it would be advisable to amend the post-conviction relief statutes
to clarify that accused with the claims identified in Part III.B can obtain a
remedy.
B. The Appropriateness of the Amendments to the California and
Texas Post-Conviction Relief Statutes
If an amendment is advisable, the next question that arises is whether
either the California or Texas amendments should be used as a drafting
model. That question should be answered in the negative. The California
amendment is excessively broad while the Texas amendment is too narrow.
1. The Texas Model
The 2015 amendment to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article
11.073(a)(2) grants an accused a new trial when subsequent scientific
research “contradicts scientific evidence relied on” at the previous trial.
What standard does the term “contradicts” embody? The popular, dictionary
148
Id. at 311 (quoting Sen. Rules Comm., third reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1058
(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 4, 2014, p. 3.) See also Iannece, supra note 12, at
220–21 (quoting Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“explain[ing]
that the expert’s ‘trial testimony is not false just because her re-evaluation of the evidence has
resulted in a different opinion . . . opinion’”)).
149
Note, supra note 131.
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meaning of “contradict” a proposition is to deny its truth or assert a logical
incongruity.150 For example, the proponent says A, and the opponent
responds non-A. The term has the same meaning in evidence law. Evidence
recognizes two related impeachment techniques: specific contradiction151
and proof of a prior inconsistent statement.152 When the courts attempt to
distinguish the latter from the former, they often emphasize that the latter
does not require proof that the witness made a prior statement that is “directly
contradictory”153 or “diametrically opposed”154 to the trial testimony.
The problem is that the Texas model is too restrictive. As Part III.A
noted, an accused ought to be entitled to a new trial if the later scientific
research either completely discredits the prior testimony or seriously
undermines our confidence in the testimony. “Contradict” would probably
subsume situations in which the later research altogether discredits the
earlier testimony. However, later research rarely has that impact. Far more
often than not, the new research will significantly undermine confidence in
the accuracy of the prior testimony. Part III.A contended that an accused
deserves a new trial when the later research has that more limited impact, but
the Texas model would not guarantee the accused a remedy in that
circumstance.
2. The California Model
Just as the Texas legislature amended its post-conviction relief statute
in 2015, the amendment to California Penal Code Section 1473 took effect
in that year. The amendment to Section 1473(e)(1) reads:
For purposes of this section, “false evidence” shall include
opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert
who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that
have been undermined by later scientific research or technological
advances.155
150
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 171 (1972); see also
Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35 (discussing the new California and Texas
legislation).
151
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 714 (6th ed.
2016).
152
Id. § 711.
153
United States v. Richardson, 515 F.3d 74, 84 (1st Cir. 2008); Udebma v. Nicoli, 237
F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2001); Laboy v. Demskie, 947 F. Supp. 733, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(“directly and positively contradict”), aff’d, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3193 (2d Cir. Feb. 26,
1998).
154
United States v. Cisneroz-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 776–77 (8th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Matlock, 109 F.3d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1997).
155
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (West 2017).
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The language “have been undermined” could serve as a useful drafting
model with slight modification. It would be necessary to revise the language
to clarify that the later research need not “completely” undermine the earlier
testimony. Without that clarification, the language would be problematic for
the same reason as the Texas model. Without that clarification, the language
would be too narrow and deny relief to some accused with the types of
meritorious claims identified in Part II.B.
However, the amendment’s reference to “opinions of experts that have
been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion” is
objectionable for the opposite reason; namely, it grants relief too liberally.
If the reference is interpreted literally, an accused is automatically entitled to
a new trial whenever the earlier expert witness “repudiates” his or her
testimony—even if the witness does not explain the reason for the
repudiation. Standing alone, proof that the witness has subjectively changed
his or her mind and opinion should not be deemed an adequate basis for postconviction relief.156
The prevailing view is that standing alone, a lay witness’s recantation
of prior testimony is not a ground for post-conviction relief.157 Admittedly,
a minority of courts treats a lay witness’s repudiation of earlier testimony as
a basis for relief whenever the witness’s testimony was the sole basis for the
conviction.158 However, that is not the general view. In the view of most
courts, a recantation alone does not necessitate a new trial.159 Rather than
accepting the recantation at face value, the court conducting the postconviction relief proceeding inquires into the credibility of the recantation.160
The court may demand substantial corroboration for the recantation.161
It is especially wrong-minded to treat an expert’s repudiation of prior
testimony as an adequate basis for post-conviction relief. No expert schooled
in the empirical tradition would accept a scientist’s change of mind without
inquiring why the scientist has adopted a new view. In Daubert, Justice
Blackmun stated that reliable “‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective
belief.”162 At the original trial, the judge should never have admitted the
156

United States v. Slough, 144 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Some circuits have held
that a witness’s recantation of trial testimony cannot be the sole basis for a new trial . . . .”).
157
See generally Thomas, supra note 23.
158
Id. § 9.
159
Id. § 10 (citing Antwine Equality Graves v. State, 187 So.3d 173 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)
and then State v. Brown, 927 N.E.2d 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)). See also id. at § 14(c)
(citing several New York decisions); Williams v. Brown, 208 F. Supp. 3d 713, 733 (E.D. Va.
2016).
160
See Thomas, supra note 23, § 5.
161
Id. § 10; see also Repka, supra note 22, at 1445.
162
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
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expert’s opinion if it amounted to nothing more than the expert’s subjective
opinion. By the same token, at the later post-conviction relief proceeding,
the judge should not accept the expert’s repudiation of the earlier opinion if
the repudiation amounts to nothing more than a subjective change of mind.
Yet, when the accused can advance one of the types of claims identified in
Part III.B, there is a satisfactory reason for the repudiation. For example, the
expert could explain that subsequent research has discredited his major
premise or significantly undermined confidence in the procedure that she
used for applying the major premise to the case-specific facts. However, if
the expert cannot articulate such an explanation for the “repudiation,”
standing alone, a repudiation does not justify a new trial.163
The bottom line is that while the Texas model is unacceptable because
it is too narrow, the California model is unsatisfactory because it is too
liberal.
C. Amending the Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Allow Relief
When the Accused Has One or More of the Meritorious Claims
Identified in Part III.B
As Part I explained, this Article has a limited scope. It does not deal
with constitutional bases for relief. Nor does it address the question of the
required standard for establishing the effect of the invalidation of the expert
testimony on the prior verdict. The narrow focus of this article is the effect
of the subsequent scientific research on the validity of the earlier expert
testimony. It would therefore be presumptuous to propose comprehensive
language for a post-conviction relief statute.
However, what about the portion of the statute describing the required
showing that the later research has invalidated the prior testimony? What
lessons can be learned from the discussion in Parts III.A and III.B?
One lesson is that any amended legislation ought to enunciate a broader
general standard than the “contradiction” language in the Texas model. Part
III.A concluded that relief should be available in alternative situations: (1)
when the subsequent research has the drastic effect of discrediting the expert
testimony; and (2) when the research has the more limited effect of seriously
undermining confidence in the correctness of the expert testimony. The
second prong is a variation of the wording of California Penal Code Section
1473(e)(1). That alternative prong is essential. Formally, as petitioner, the
accused has the ultimate burden of proof in the post-conviction relief
proceeding. However, given the profound constitutional values implicated
by the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard governing at the original
163

See Iannece, supra note 12, at 220–21 (discussing Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).
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trial,164 the accused should not be required to “completely dispel the old
evidence.”165
Secondly, unlike the California model, the amendment should not
provide that without more, the prior expert witness’s repudiation or
recantation of their opinion is an adequate basis for relief. In the postconviction relief proceeding, the critical question is why the expert has
recanted or why another scientist disputes that expert’s testimony. The types
of subsequent scientific developments identified in Part III.B can supply
adequate answers to the why question. Rather than asking whether the prior
expert has changed his or her subjective state of mind, the judge ought to
inquire whether the accused has established one of the five types of claims
discussed in Part III.B. There is no need to even refer to recantation or
repudiation in the text of the amendment. It does not matter whether the
testimony of the prior witness or that of another expert proves the subsequent
development; the dispositive issue is whether such a development has
occurred.
The final drafting question is whether the text of the amendment should
specify the five types of claims listed in Part III.B. If the statutory language
did so, there would be the risk that judges applying the statute would treat
the listings as pigeonholes and strain to cram the fact situation into one of
164
The fundamental liberty interest led the Supreme Court to elevate the ultimate burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to constitutional status in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970). At the end of the same decade, the Court would invoke the same interest as the basis
for revising the constitutional standard for determining whether the prosecution has sustained
its initial burden of production—the legal sufficiency test for determining whether the
prosecution has made out a case submissible to the jury. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979). Prior to Jackson, the majority view was that the standard for the legal sufficiency of
the evidence in a criminal case was the same as the standard in a civil case, namely, whether
cumulatively the prosecution evidence was sufficient to support a permissive inference of the
existence of every element of the charged crime. However, the Jackson Court announced that
due process mandates a more exacting standard, namely, whether the evidence would
necessarily leave a juror with a reasonable doubt about the existence of the element. Edward
J. Imwinkelried, Jackson v. Virginia: Reopening the Pandora’s Box of the Legal Sufficiency
of Drug Identification Evidence, 73 KY. L.J. 1 (1985). The courts have yet to carefully
examine the question of whether, under the Jackson standard, a juror presented with testimony
by both the proponents and opponents of Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) would necessarily
have a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. In the typical case in which the courts
apply Jackson, the focus is on the analysis of the absolute weakness of the prosecution case.
As Part III.A explained, there is a plausible case for SBS. See supra Part III.A. Here the
defense would make a slightly different argument; the defense would contend that in applying
the Jackson test, the court should also consider the contrary defense expert testimony. The
thrust of the argument would be that the strength of the defense testimony so weakens the
prosecution testimony that a juror who had heard both sides’ testimony would necessarily
entertain a lingering, reasonable doubt about guilt. Hopefully, in the near future, the courts
will have occasion to address the merits of that argument.
165
Iannece, supra note 12, at 217 (quoting State v. Edmonds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 599 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2008)).
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pigeonholes. In text, it is probably preferable to refer generically to “any
essential element” of the prior testimony. The drafters could follow the
example of the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000
amendment to Rule 702, which, as previously stated, asserts that “any step
that renders the analysis unreliable . . . renders the expert’s testimony
inadmissible.”166 In similar fashion, the drafters could indicate in the
legislative history that subsequent research discrediting or seriously
undermining confidence in any essential element or step is cognizable.
Then, just as the 2000 Note lists five additional factors relevant to the
evaluation of the reliability of proffered testimony, the drafters could list the
five types of claims identified in Part III.B.
Negatively, an amendment drafted along these lines would avoid the
mistakes committed by the California and Texas drafters. Affirmatively, it
would provide reasonable guidance to the courts tasked to apply the
amendment. Most importantly, it would largely assure that an accused with
a meritorious variation of a claim identified in Part III.B will be granted the
new trial that he or she deserves.
V.

CONCLUSION

The wave of DNA exonerations is gradually coming to an end.167 Now
that most law enforcement authorities have ready access to DNA testing,
DNA testing is conducted before trial; and, understandably, there are fewer
DNA exonerations after a conviction.168 In part, the criminal justice system
embraced the process of DNA exoneration so enthusiastically because a
post-conviction DNA test did not merely raise doubts about the accuracy of
the prior conviction; an exclusion could “point unerringly to innocence.”169
For that matter, in roughly half of the DNA exonerations, the post-conviction
test not only exculpated the accused but also led to the identification of the
real culprit.170 Those cases played out like a Perry Mason episode. Before
166
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (quoting In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)).
167
Kevin Davis, Prisoner Exonerations Are at an All-Time High, and It’s Not Because of
DNA Testing, 100 A.B.A. J. 55, 57 (Sept. 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/articl
e/prisoner_exonerations_are_at_an_all-time_high (“[E]xonerations due to DNA evidence
have been on the decline for much of the past decade. According to the registry, the number
of exonerations in which DNA played any role dropped from 23 in 2005 to 20 in 2012 and 18
in 2013.”); The National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exone
ration (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).
168
Davis, supra note 167, at 57 (“One of the reasons for the decline is that many of the
cases in which DNA testing was available to clear the wrongfully convicted have played out.
DNA testing is now routine, and it often clears suspects long before trial.”).
169
In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (2016) (quoting In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal.
1993)).
170
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
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the end of every episode, Perry had both established his client’s innocence
and identified the perpetrator.
However, real life is not as simple as a Perry Mason episode. In many
cases, the new scientific evidence creates grave doubts about the accuracy of
the prior conviction but falls short of demonstrating the accused’s undeniable
innocence.171 When the new science undermines confidence in the earlier
conviction without eliminating the possibility of guilt, the courts and
legislatures have a far more difficult policy choice: they must weigh the
competing interests in accuracy and finality.172
Part III.A proposed a general standard for striking the balance between
those interests. Using that standard, Part III.B identified five situations in
which it contends an accused is entitled to the relief of a new trial. In all
these situations, the subsequent scientific research does more than raise a
doubt about the prior conviction; rather, the new science fundamentally
shakes our confidence in the conviction. The new research may not entirely
eliminate the possibility of the accused’s guilt, but sometimes the doubts
about the justice of the prior conviction are so pronounced that they trump
the substantial public interest in finality of judgment.173 In these five
situations, the sounder choice is accuracy over finality.174 The Idaho
Supreme Court framed the stark choice aptly:
The worst consequence of granting the [new trial] motion is that
the state will have the expense of another trial . . . . [T]he worst
consequence of denying the motion is that the defendants remain
convicted of a crime which they might have not have
committed.175
In that case, the trial judge sagely commented: At least in some instances,
“justice is more important than expense.”176

GO WRONG 5 (2011) (“In 45% of the 250 postconviction DNA exonerations (112 cases), the
test results identified the culprit.”); Karen Kafadar & Anne-Marie Mazza, Using Faulty
Forensic Science, Courts Fail the Innocent, LIVESCIENCE (Feb. 24, 2015),
https://www.livescience.com/49929-faulty-forensic-science-failing-united-states-courtsystem.html (“[I]n roughly half of the overturned cases, the new [DNA] evidence led to the
conviction of the person who actually committed the crime.”).
171
Chandler, supra note 17, at 16.
172
Iannece, supra note 12, at 227; Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1049.
173
Note, supra note 131, at 703.
174
Ex parte White, 506 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
175
State v. Keely, 620 P.2d 284, 285 n.4 (Idaho 1980). See Repka, supra note 22, at 1458.
176
Keely, 620 P.2d at 285. See Repka, supra note 22, at 1458–59.

